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No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Manitoba : 
An Overview 
Jeffrey SCHNOOR 
In 1993, Manitoba followed Quebec's lead and became the second 
jurisdiction in North America to abolish the traditional tort system and 
adopt a pure no-fault compensation plan for victims of automobile acci-
dents; the plan has been in operation since 1994. This paper begins with an 
examination of some of the events which led to this reform. It then reviews 
the scope of the plan (including consideration of a judgment of the Mani-
toba Court of Appeal on the subject) and gives an overview of the plan's 
operation, including the compensation provided by it and the provisions for 
review and appeal of decisions. At the end of the paper, an addendum 
summarizes (and briefly comments on) a review of the no-fault plan which 
was released following the completion of the paper. 
En 1993, le Manitoba a suivi l'exemple du Québec et est devenu le 
deuxième endroit en Amérique du nord à remplacer le régime de droit 
commun de la responsabilité civile en matière d'accidents d'automobiles 
par un système intégral d'indemnisation sans égard à la responsabilité; le 
régime est en vigueur depuis 1994. Le présent texte rappelle certains des 
événements qui ont mené à cette réforme. L'auteur traite ensuite de l'éten-
due du régime en évoquant une décision de la Cour d'appel du Mani-
toba sur le sujet et décrit son fonciionnement (indemnités prévues, procé-
dures de révision et d'appel). Dans un addendum, il résume et commente 
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brièvement le contenu d'un rapport ayant pour objet l'examen du nouveau 
régime d'indemnisaiion et dont les résultats sont devenus disponibles après 
la réalisation du présent texte. 
Pages 
1. Background to Reform in Manitoba 337 
2. Overview of the Legislation 339 
2.1 Scope of the Plan 340 
2.1.1 No-fault, No-tort 340 
2.1.2 Bodily Injury Caused by an Automobile 340 
2.1.3 Exceptions and exclusions from compensation 343 
2.2 Compensation for Injuries 345 
2.2.1 Income Replacement Indemnity 345 
2.2.1.1 Persons capable of employment 346 
2.2.1.2 Studentsand minors 348 
2.2.1.3 Persons not capable of employment 349 
2.2.1.4 End of entitlement to income replacement indemnity 350 
2.2.2 Compensation for Permanent Impairment 351 
2.2.3 Reimbursement of Expenses 352 
2.2.4 Rehabilitation 353 
2.2.5 Death Benefits 354 
2.3 Claims for Compensation 356 
2.4 Indexation for Inflation 358 
2.5 Review and Appeal 358 
2.6 Compensation under other Acts or plans 362 
Conclusion : Mandatory Review of the Legislation 363 
Addendum 364 
On July 27, 1993, Manitoba became the second jurisdiction in North 
America to adopt a pure no-fault insurance plan for the compensation of 
personal injuries sustained in automobile accidents. The plan replaced an 
add-on insurance system in which persons injured in automobile accidents 
were entitled to receive minimal no-fault benefits in addition to any damages 
which they were able to obtain under the traditional fault-based tort system. 
The add-on system was, and the no-fault plan is, administered by the 
provincial government-owned Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation 
(variously referred to as «MPI», «MPIC», the «Corporation» or 
« Autopac »), the exclusive provider of basic automobile insurance in the 
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province. The no-fault insurance plan, which MPI has named the Personal 
Injury Protection Plan (« PIPP »), came into force on March 1, 1994. 
This paper will examine some of the background to the introduction of 
no-fault automobile insurance in Manitoba and provide an overview of its 
scope and operation and the compensation which it provides. The paper will 
conclude with some brief comments on the plan's future direction. 
1. Background to Reform in Manitoba 
I believe that increased benefits, including substantial benefits for non-economic 
losses such as compensation for pain and suffering, could be offered at lower cost 
if the tort system were to be eliminated and a pure no-fault system implemented. 
In my opinion the implementation of a pure no-fault automobile insurance system 
is the issue which requires most urgent consideration by the government of the 
province of Manitoba, because that system offers the greatest opportunity to 
reduce costs and increase benefits'. 
This was the pivotal recommendation of Provincial Court Judge Robert 
Kopstein in his 1988 Report of the Autopac Review Commission. Judge 
Kopstein was appointed by the Manitoba government « to solicit the views 
of Manitobans and to carry out research on the most appropriate ways for 
The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation (MPIC) to provide low cost, 
high quality, vehicle insurance on a self-sustaining basis2 ». After reviewing 
alternative schemes of providing compensation for bodily injuries sustained 
in automobile accidents, he concluded that « [tjhe tort system has the 
capacity to be grievously inequitable and does operate to produce harsh 
inequities3 ». 
Fault is unsatisfactory as a criterion upon which to base entitlement to adequate 
compensation for injuries resulting from motor vehicle accidents. It can fail to 
compensate the innocent, or can fail to compensate the innocent to an acceptable 
level, and it will fail to compensate normally careful drivers who make a mistake4. 
Judge Kopstein also rejected any deterrent effect propounded for the 
tort system5. In short, he characterized the tort system as «a game of 
chance, with high stakes6 ». 
1. AUTOPAC REVIEW COMMISSION, Report of the Autopac Review Commission (1988), 
vo.. 1, Winnipeg, Government of Manitoba, p. 3 [hereinafter : « KOPSTEIN REPORT »]. 
2. Id., p. 1. 
3. Id., p. 28. 
4. Id,, p. 29. 
5. Ibid. : «The ability of the tort system to deter negligent driving is not supported by 
evidence, nor in light of public liability insurance is it supported by common sense. The 
mere hope that the tort system may deter negligent driving is not by itself sufficient 
justification for its perpetuation ». 
6. KOPSTEIN REPORT, op. cit., note 1, vol. 2, Position Paper No. 2 (Bodily Injury Compen-
sation), p. 90. 
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These conclusions of Judge Kopstein were an important contribution 
to the development of automobile injury compensation in Manitoba. How-
ever, Judge Kopstein's recommendations for a pure no-fault automobile 
insurance system were not immediately adopted and it cannot truly be said 
that the introduction of such a plan in 1993 was a response to his report. It 
would be fairer to say that the introduction of the no-fault plan flowed out 
of the events which led to the appointment of Judge Kopstein. In December 
of 1987, MPI announced rate increases for automobile insurance averaging 
24 per cent. This was enormously unpopular and generated intense public 
reaction : 
[M]ore than 1,000 people showed up in cold weather to protest the increased 
Autopac rates, 55,000 signed petitions, thousands sent coupons contained in an 
advertisement by the Manitoba Motor League and hundreds called the minister's 
office7. 
Amongst the initiatives taken to stem the tide of popular unrest gener-
ated by the large rate increases was the appointment of Judge Kopstein. In 
the end, however, MPIC's hefty increases in auto rates were the straw that 
broke the back of the former NDP government and brought the Conserva-
tives to power in April [1988]8. The lessons of 1987 and 1988—the power of 
automobile insurance rates to break governments — were not lost on the 
succeeding Progressive Conservative government. Faced again with rising 
automobile insurance rates, it announced in 1993 its intention to adopt a 
no-fault automobile injury compensation plan. In introducing the legisla-
tion, the Honourable Glen Cummings, then Minister charged with the 
administration of The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, set out 
its four key principles : 
coverage for all Manitobans injured anywhere in Canada or the United States as a 
result of an automobile accident ; indexing of benefits to ensure compensation is 
not eroded by inflation ; compensation for actual financial losses, including cover-
age for medical rehabilitation and other expenses ; guaranteed compensation for all 
injured people regardless of who was at fault for the accident9. 
However, his comments about rate stability overshadowed his descrip-
tion of the features of the no-fault plan : 
This bill [...] will provide accident victims with fair compensation for their injuries 
and, at the same time, help stabilize Autopac rates over the long run. 
7. A. BILLINKOFF, « Plummeting popularity spurs NDP Autopac cuts » The Winnipeg Free 
Press (February 9, 1988) 7. 
8. B. HUCK, «Furor cools after Manitoba election» The Financial Post (August 8, 1988) 
5. 
9. MANITOBA, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, Debates and Proceedings (Hansard), 3 rd Session, 
35,h Legislature, May 26, 1993, p. 34111 
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The government recognizes that Bill 37 represents a major departure from the 
status quo, but let me assure everyone in this House that such a dramatic action is 
what may well be preferable to the alternative, and that alternative may be continu-
ing massive increases in injury-claim costs resulting in a doubling of Autopac 
premiums by the turn of the century. 
[•••] 
With these changes, very simply, Manitobans will no longer face the unacceptably 
high premium costs that they experienced last year10. 
In a province where automobile insurance is provided by a govern-
ment-owned corporation, premiums are closely associated by the public 
with the government of the day and this has inevitably shaped policy making 
in Manitoba. 
2. Overview of the Legislation 
The no-fault plan of compensation for personal injuries incurred in an 
automobile accident is set out in Part 2 of The Manitoba Public Insurance 
Corporation Act11. The Part is aptly entitled «Universal Bodily Injury 
Compensation», highlighting the fact that the plan is essentially one of 
social welfare and is not based on insurance principles. 
The scope of the plan will be examined in this part, followed by a 
description of the forms of compensation available to injured persons. This 
part will then conclude with a discussion of the claims and appeals proce-
dures contemplated by the Act and the Act's interaction with other compen-
sation plans. It will be readily apparent that the legislation closely follows 
its counterpart in Quebec12. 
10. Ibid. According to MPI, «PIPP is performing even better than anticipated, resulting in 
a lower cost per injury claim » : MANITOBA PUBLIC INSURANCE, Annual Report 1996, 
(May 5, 1997) p. 19. 
11. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P215 as amended by 
The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Amendment and Consequential Amend-
ments Act, S.M. 1993, c. 36, s. 5 ; minor amendments have been made to Part 2 since its 
enactment : The Highway Traffic Amendment and Consequential Amendments Act, S.M. 
1994, c. 4, s. 37; The Statute Law Amendment Act, 1994, S.M. 1994, c. 20, s. 16; The 
Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Amendment Act, S.M. 1996, c. 11 ; The Statute 
Law Amendment Act, 1996, S.M. 1996, c. 64, s. 12; The Manitoba Public Insurance 
Corporation Amendment Act, S.M. 1997, c. 23 [the Act as amended is hereinafter referred 
to as The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act]. 
12. This was noted by the Manitoba Court of Appeal. «There can be little doubt that the 
Manitoba legislation was modelled on the Quebec plan. It is worded similarly, but is not 
identical to that plan » : McMillan v. Rural Municipality of Thompson, (1997) 144 D.L.R. 
(4th) 53, at 64 (Man. C.A.), (Helper J.A.) [hereinafter McMillan v. R.M. of Thompson 
(Man. C.A.)]. 
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2.1 Scope of the Plan 
2.1.1 No-fault, No-tort 
Every resident of Manitoba is entitled to compensation for any bodily 
injury (including death) caused by an automobile if the accident occurs in 
Canada or the United States after March 1, 199413. This compensation is 
based on two central principles. First, compensation is paid without regard 
to fault14. Second, no tort action can be commenced in court in respect of a 
bodily injury or death to which the compensation plan applies15. There is no 
compensation available from the Corporation or any other person16 beyond 
that which is provided by the Act. 
2.1.2 Bodily Injury Caused by an Automobile 
Compensation under the Act is dependent on there being an accident 
in which bodily injury is caused by an automobile. The phrase «bodily 
injury caused by an automobile » is a defined term ; it means « any bodily 
injury caused by an automobile, by the use of an automobile, or by a load, 
including bodily injury caused by a trailer used with an automobile17 ». 
This definition formed the basis of the most important legal challenge 
to date to the scope of Manitoba's no-fault plan, McMillan v. Rural Munici-
pality of Thompson^. That case dealt with two individuals who suffered 
serious injuries when their automobile plunged into an unmarked gap in a 
road caused when a bridge was washed out. They sought a determination of 
a question of law before trial ; they asked whether they could proceed with 
a tort action against the municipality for its alleged negligence or whether 
13. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 71 (1) and 74 (1). Rules concerning 
residence in Manitoba are set out in regulation : Definitions and Interpretation (Universal 
Bodily Injury Compensation) Regulation, M.R. 37/94, s. 3. 
14. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 73. 
15. Id., s. 72. As a consequence, a lawsuit to recover the cost of medical care required 
because of an automobile accident cannot be brought against the person responsible for 
the accident where the victim obtains compensation under the Act : The Health Services 
Insurance Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. H35, s. 97 (2). An exception is made for non-residents of 
Manitoba ; they may be sued to recover the cost of medical care or compensation paid 
under The Workers Compensation Act or The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act to 
the extent that they are responsible for the accident : The Manitoba Public Insurance 
Corporation Act, s. 78. 
16. Manitobans of course remain free to obtain their own first-party life, disability or 
accident insurance. 
17. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act., s. 70 (1). 
18. McMillan v. R. M. of Thompson (Man. C.A.), supra, note 12; application for leave to 
appeal to Supreme Court of Canada dismissed October 16, 1997. 
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they were precluded from doing so by Part 2 of the Act19. The motions court 
judge, Oliphant A.C.J.Q.B., held that such a tort action could proceed and, 
thus, that the accident in question did not fall within the no-fault plan : 
I conclude that in order for bodily injuries to be caused by the use of an automobile, 
there must be a direct or proximate relationship between the use of the automobile 
and the injuries. 
In the case at bar, it is not possible to trace a continuous chain of causation 
unbroken by the interposition of a new act of negligence. 
In my opinion, it was not the use of the automobile that caused the bodily injuries 
in question ; it was, for the purposes of this motion, the negligence of the defendant. 
The use of the automobile was merely fortuitous20. 
This conclusion, if sustained, would have had very serious conse-
quences for Manitoba's no-fault plan. As Helper J.A. noted on the appeal of 
the case, it would have resulted in « a cumbersome two-step system which 
necessitates a trial on the issue of negligence in all accidents involving an 
automobile and thus perpetuates the uncertainty of the result for a victim. » 
It would have also resulted in the legislation providing « different remedies 
for victims depending upon the proximate cause of an accident. The exact 
opposite intent is clear from the reading of Part 2 and from an examination 
of the debates and the [Kopstein] Report21 ». Helper J.A., writing the lead 
opinion of a unanimous Court, expressed the view that 
the motions judge placed an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation on the phrase 
« caused by », an interpretation that is inconsistent with both the ordinary meaning 
of those words and the spirit of the legislation. A restrictive interpretation is also 
contrary to current jurisprudence. 
[.••] 
Surely the legislation is to be interpreted in a manner that results in equality and 
equity. A restrictive interpretation of the words « caused by » would defeat many 
of the objectives identified by the legislators prior to the introduction of the 
enactment : the introduction of a simplified insurance scheme, the elimination of 
litigation for bodily injuries received in the use of an automobile and the desire to 
ensure that all victims receive timely compensation22. 
Helper J.A. held that it is the cause of the injuries, not of the accident, 
which is determinative. It is sufficient that the injuries are related in some 
way to the use of an automobile : 
where the words «caused by» are used, there must be some link between the 
injuries sustained and the use of the automobile [...]. The legislation does not 
require more. It does not seek out causation in terms of the accident. It specifically 
19. This motion was made even though the injured individuals had applied for and received 
compensation under Part 2 of the Act (universal bodily injury compensation). 
20. McMillan v. Rural Municipality of Thompson (6 May 1996), Nos. CI95-01-87533 and 
CI95-01-89075, 13-14 (Man. Q.B.). 
21. McMillan v. R.M. of Thompson (Man. C.A.), supra, note 12, 67. 
22. Id., 66-67. 
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eliminates the concept of fault. In light of the elimination of fault, there is no 
support for the submission that the proximate cause of an automobile accident 
determines the application of Part 2. 
Part 2 applies where there is a direct relationship between the automobile being 
used and the injuries suffered [...]. While there must be a connection between the 
automobile and the injuries, judicial cause, or proximate cause is not required by 
the legislation. The legislation does not address the cause of the accident, only the 
cause of the injuries. 
[•••] 
The only question which required determination was: Were the respondents' 
injuries caused by (in the sense of being related to) the use of an automobile ? The 
answer to that question is undoubtedly « yes »23. 
For these reasons, Helper J. A. held that Part 2 of the Act did apply to 
the accident in question and that the injured individuals could not bring a 
tort action against the municipality24. 
Although Kroft J. A. concurred in the result, it is interesting to note that 
he took a somewhat more cautious approach. He did not view the motions 
court judge's error to have been in taking a restrictive or technical, rather 
than a liberal, approach to the phrase «caused by». Rather, it «was in 
failing to fully appreciate that negligence and its proximate relationship to 
the event are no longer factors for consideration». He emphasized the 
continued importance of cause and effect : 
if a tort action is to be barred, the words « bodily injury [...] caused [...] by the use 
of an automobile » clearly do require a demonstration of consequential connection 
between the use of an automobile on the one hand and the bodily injuries suffered 
by the claimant on the other25. 
Kroft J.A. noted a number of hypothetical situations which might be 
problematic under the Manitoba legislation : for example, 
23. Id., 76-77. 
24. This gives rise to a question of whether municipalities, freed of the fear of being found 
liable for substantial monetary damages in a tort suit, will take seriously their obligations 
under The Municipal Act to keep roads in good repair. As Kroft J.A. notes, « [t]he 
obligation of a municipality to maintain its roads is not in any way limited by Part 2 and 
the liability to compensate for damages arising from a breach of that duty is not dimin-
ished as regards property damage, personal injuries to pedestrians, cyclists or other such 
users of the road as are exempt by reason of s. 71 (2) of The M.P.I.C. Act» : McMillan 
v. R.M. of Thompson (Man. C.A.), supra, note 12, 84. However, these liabilities are 
comparatively small. To what extent have municipal governments in fact been motivated 
by fear of liability as opposed to respect for law and a concern to serve their citizens ? 
Although it is submitted that the Manitoba Court of Appeal was correct in deciding that 
a tort suit could not be brought against the Rural Municipality of Thompson, the effect, 
if any, that this will have on the behaviour of municipal governments is unknown and 
deserves continuing scrutiny 
25. Id., 83. 
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if one passenger suffered injuries from an assault inflicted upon him by another 
passenger while they were being transported in an automobile; or if a driver 
stopped his motor vehicle for a moment to speak to a friend who was standing at 
the edge of a road and if a negligent hunter in a nearby field negligently discharged 
his shotgun thereby wounding both. In the latter example, would we have a 
situation where the driver was restricted to M.P.I.C. benefits but his friend could 
sue the hunter26 ? 
He seemed to stop short of the more expansive approach of Helper J.A. 
and expressly left open the possibility of a future decision that some or all 
of these situations might fall outside the scope of the legislation. « I am not 
prepared to say that any injury suffered in or in some remote way involved 
with an automobile is necessarily caused by it or the use of it27 ». 
2.1.3 Exceptions and exclusions from compensation 
The Act contains a number of exceptions and exclusions from the 
scope of the no-fault plan. 
Exceptions are made to the no-fault and no-tort principles in cases 
where the accident involves a non-resident of the province or occurs outside 
the province. A non-resident of Manitoba who is injured in an accident in 
Manitoba is entitled to compensation in accordance with any agreement 
which the Corporation has made with the government of that person's 
residence28. In the absence of such an agreement, a non-resident who is 
injured in an accident in Manitoba is entitled to compensation to the extent 
that the Corporation decides that he or she is not responsible for the 
accident29. The Corporation may sue a non-resident to recover amounts 
which it pays to a Manitoba resident for an accident in Manitoba where the 
non-resident is at fault ; the Corporation is entitled to reimbursement to the 
extent of the non-resident's fault30. Where a resident of Manitoba is injured 
elsewhere in Canada or the United States, the Corporation is subrogated to 
that person's right of recovery, if any, in that other jurisdiction. The Corpo-
ration is entitled to recover the amount of compensation which it must pay 
to the Manitoban. The Manitoban is entitled to sue for and retain any 
compensation available under the law of the other jurisdiction which is in 
excess of the universal bodily injury compensation to which he or she is 
entitled31. 
26. Id,, 82. 
27. Id.,81. 
28. To date, agreements have been entered into with Saskatchewan and Alberta. 
29. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 75 (1). A non-resident who disagrees 
with that decision may appeal it to the Court of Queen's Bench : Id., s. 75 (2). 
30. Id., s. 77. 
31. Id., s. 76. 
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Where a person willfully causes an accident (for example, a suicide 
attempt), he or she will not be entitled to universal bodily injury compensa-
tion and his or her dependants will not be entitled to death benefits32. 
Similarly, if the death of a person is wilfully caused by a dependant, that 
dependant will not be entitled to death benefits33. In either case, anyone else 
injured in the accident is entitled to compensation in the normal fashion. 
Where there is a dispute as to whether an accident was wilfully caused, an 
appeal of the corporation's decision lies to the Court of Queen's Bench34. 
An exception to the no-fault principle is made for victims who are 
convicted of a serious offence in respect of the accident, such as causing 
death or bodily harm by criminal negligence or operating a motor vehicle 
while impaired35. These are generally offences which have a causal link with 
the accident and the legislation penalizes the victim for the default. The 
Corporation is required to determine the extent to which the victim is 
responsible for the accident. The victim's entitlement to an income replace-
ment indemnity is then reduced for the first 12 months after the accident by 
the percentage of responsibility determined by the Corporation36. The vic-
tim's entitlement to other benefits under the Act, such as compensation for 
permanent impairment or reimbursement of expenses, is unaffected37. 
32. Id., s. 79(1). 
33. Id., s. 79 (2). 
34. Id., s. 79(3). 
35. Id., s. 161 (1 ). The following provisions of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. (1985), c. C-46 are 
listed : section 220 (cause death by criminal negligence) ; section 221 (cause bodily harm 
by criminal negligence) ; section 236 (manslaughter) ; clause 249 (1 ) (a) or subsection 249 
(2) (dangerous operation of a motor vehicle) ; subsection 249 (3) (dangerous operation 
causing bodily harm) ; subsection 249 (4) (dangerous operation causing death) ; subsec-
tion 252 (1) (failure to stop at the scene of an accident) ; section 253 or subsection 255 
(1 ) (operating a motor vehicle while impaired) ; subsection 255 (2) (impaired driving 
causing bodily harm) ; subsection 255 (3) (impaired driving causing death) ; and subsec-
tion 254 (5) (failure to comply with a demand for breath sample). Offences in the United 
States which are the same or similar are also included : The Manitoba Public Insurance 
Corporation Act, s. 161 (2). 
36. Id., s. 161 (3). A victim may appeal the percentage of responsibility determined by the 
Corporation to the Court of Queen's Bench : Id.,s. 161 (4). If the Corporation has already 
paid an income replacement indemnity to the victim before his or her conviction, it is 
entitled to reimbursement from the victim : Id., s. 189. 
37. Judge Kopstein's recommendations were somewhat different. He recommended that 
« in comparison with inadvertent negligence, criminal code driving convictions demon-
strate a flagrant disregard for the lives and safety of other people. In my opinion, a 
person injured in the course of committing a criminal code offence should be barred 
from receiving disability benefits for one year from the date of an accident, and from 
entitlement to impairment benefits under a no-fault scheme. This bar should prevail 
unless, through application to the court, such person can establish that, notwithstanding 
the criminal conduct which led to the conviction, the accident occurred primarily as a 
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No income replacement indemnity is payable to a victim while he or 
she is in jail after being convicted of any offence38. 
The no-fault plan does not apply at all to injuries incurred in a number 
of listed situations which are outside the realm of «ordinary» highway 
traffic. These include, for example, injuries which are the result of accidents 
caused by a farm tractor that occur off a highway and injuries caused as a 
result of an automobile race on a track closed to other traffic. In those 
situations, the common law, and the right to sue, are preserved39. 
2.2 Compensation for Injuries 
The following forms of compensation are available to victims of auto-
mobile accidents : income replacement indemnity, compensation for perma-
nent impairment, reimbursement of expenses, rehabilitation costs and, 
where the injuries are fatal, death benefits. Each of these forms of compen-
sation will be discussed in turn. 
2.2.1 Income Replacement Indemnity 
Accident victims are entitled to receive compensation for the income 
which they lose as a result of the automobile accident or, in some cases, for 
the loss of their capacity to earn an income. Generally, the income replace-
ment indemnity of a victim is equal to 90 % of his or her net annual income 
(actual or imputed)40. A victim's net income is his or her gross yearly 
employment income, to a maximum of $55,0004! (currently $57,500 as a 
result of indexing required by the Act42), less the applicable income 
result of the negligence or fault of another person, or from a cause unrelated to his or 
her criminal conduct ». He also recommended that the Corporation should retain a right 
of subrogation against such persons : KOPSTEIN REPORT, op. cit., note 1, vol. 2, Position 
Paper No. 2 (Bodily Injury Compensation), p. 96. 
38. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 162 (1). If a victim's conviction is 
subsequently reversed on appeal, the victim is entitled to the missed income replacement 
indemnity with interest: Id., s. 162 (2). 
39. Id., s. 71 (2). 
40. Id.,s. Ill (1). Generally speaking, the income replacement indemnity of a full-time earner 
or of a victim for whom the Corporation has determined an employment cannot be less 
than one based on a gross income resulting from the minimum wage and standard hours 
of work set by The Employment Standards Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. El 10, s. 111 (2). 
41. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 114 (1). 
42. The maximum yearly insurable earnings is indexed according to changes in the industrial 
average wage : Id., s. 114 (2) to (4). Victims are free to obtain private coverage for earnings 
in excess of the maximum yearly insurable earnings : Id., s. 194. All dollar amounts set 
out in the Act are subject to indexation (discussed infra). In this paper, both the dollar 
amount set out in the Act and the current indexed amount (for the period March 1, 1997 
to March 1, 1998) will be stated. 
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tax, Canada Pension Plan contributions and employment insurance pre-
miums43. 
No income replacement indemnity is paid in respect of the first seven 
days after an accident44. 
Entitlement to an income replacement indemnity depends on whetfier 
the victim was or was capable of being a member of the work force at the 
time of the accident. Accordingly, the Act creates a number of categories for 
the purpose of determining eligibility for an income replacement indemnity : 
full-time earners, temporary earners, part-time earners, non-earners, stu-
dents, minors, victims aged 65 or older and persons incapable of employ-
ment45. Specific rules set out the method of determining the gross income 
for each of these categories of victims. 
2.2.1.1 Persons capable of employment 
A full-time earner is entitled to an income replacement indemnity based 
on any income lost as a result of the accident46. 
A temporary earner, a part-time earner, a non-earner and any earner 
who is 66 years of age or older at the time of the accident is entitled to an 
income replacement indemnity in respect of actual income lost during the 
first 180 days after the accident47. Thereafter, they are compensated for the 
loss of their capacity to earn income. The Corporation must, on the basis of 
the education, training, work experience and physical and intellectual abili-
ties of the victim immediately before the accident, determine an employ-
ment which he or she could have held on a regular and full-time basis. After 
the first 180 days after the accident, these victims are entitled to an income 
replacement indemnity based on the gross income that the Corporation 
43. Id., s. 112. Rules respecting the determination of a victim's gross yearly employment 
income and net income are set out in regulation : Determination of Income and Employ-
ment (Universal Bodily Injury Compensation) Regulation, M.R. 39/94 as amended by 
M.R. 93/95. 
44. Id., s. 152 (2). 
45. Further particulars of the meaning of full-time employment, part-time employment and 
temporary employment are set out in regulation : Definitions and Interpretation (Uni-
versal Bodily Injury Compensation) Regulation, M.R. 37/94, s. 4, 5 and 6. 
46. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 81. 
47. Id., ss. 83, 85 and 102. A non-eamer is a victim who, at the time of the accident, is not 
employed but who is able to work. A non-earner may nonetheless have lost income : 
for example, employment insurance benefits lost by reason of not being available for 
work because of the injuries sustained in the accident. 
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determines the victim could have earned from the determined employ-
ment48. 
A further determination of employment may be made in order to 
evaluate the residual capacity of the victim and ensure that the Corporation 
compensates only for loss of income attributable to the accident. At any 
time after the second anniversary of the accident, the Corporation may 
determine an employment for a victim (including a full-time earner) who is 
able to work but is unable because of the accident to hold the full-time 
employment held at the time of the accident or the employment previously 
determined for him or her by the Corporation49. This determination is based 
on the education, training, work experience and physical and intellectual 
abilities of the victim at the time of the determination, not at the time of the 
accident ; regard is also had to any knowledge or skill acquired in a rehabili-
tation program and to the general availability of the determined employ-
ment50. When such a determination of employment is made, the victim's 
entitlement to his or her income replacement indemnity ceases one year 
later51 ; this one year extension of the indemnity is intended to assist the 
victim while he or she seeks employment. Thereafter, the victim is entitled 
to an income replacement indemnity equal to the difference between the 
indemnity the victim was receiving at the time the employment was deter-
mined and the net income the victim earns or could earn from the deter-
mined employment52. 
48. Id., ss. 84, 86 and 103 ; the employment is determined in accordance with section 106. 
49. Id., s. 107. An employment may also be determined for a student or minor at any time 
after the scheduled end of the victim's current studies : Id., s. 108. 
50. Id., s. 109. 
51. Id., s. 110(1) (d). 
52. Id., s. 115. The following example is illustrative. As a result of an accident in March 
1994, a victim becomes unable to continue his or her employment as a full-time machinist 
(which had a gross income of $3,000 and a net income of $2,000 per month). As a result 
of the injuries suffered in the accident, the victim will never be able to return to that 
employment. At the end of his or her program of rehabilitation in December 1996, the 
Corporation determines an employment for the victim as a full-time custodian (which 
can earn the victim a gross income of $2,500 and a net income of $1 600 per month). As 
a result, the victim continues to receive his or her income replacement indemnity (90 % 
of $2,000, or $1 800 per month) for one further year until December 1997 and the 
indemnity then ceases. However, since the victim's gross income from his or her em-
ployment as a custodian (or which he or she could earn as a custodian) is less than the 
gross income which he or she earned as a machinist, the victim is entitled to an indemnity 
equal to the difference between the income replacement indemnity received before the 
determination of employment and the net income earned, or which could be earned as 
a custodian ($1 800 less $1 600 or $200 per month) 
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Special additional rules apply to senior citizens. If a victim who is 
65 years of age or older on the day of the accident is entitled to an income 
replacement indemnity, he or she will receive the full amount of the indem-
nity for one year. Thereafter, it will be reduced by 25 % each year and will 
cease four years after the accident53. A non-earner who, on the day of the 
accident, is 66 years of age or older is not entitled to an income replacement 
indemnity54. 
2.2.1.2 Students and minors 
« Minors » are victims under the age of 16 at the time of the accident ; 
« students » are victims 16 years of age or older who are attending school on 
a full-time basis at the time of the accident55. Because students and minors 
have not typically entered the workforce, a determination of their capacity 
to earn income over the course of their lives had they not been injured in an 
automobile accident would be speculative at best. Accordingly, the Act 
provides a separate set of rules to determine their entitlement to an income 
replacement indemnity. 
A minor is entitled to receive a fixed indemnity if he or she is unable to 
begin or complete a school year. Thus, for example, a minor who misses a 
month of school as a result of an accident but is nonetheless able to return 
to school and successfully complete the year would receive no indemnity 
for the lost month ; an indemnity would be paid only if the student could not 
complete the year. The Act provides for an indemnity of $3 400 (currently 
$3 619 after indexation) for each school year not completed at the elemen-
tary level and $6 300 (currently $6 705) for each school year not completed 
at the secondary level56. A minor is also entitled to an income replacement 
indemnity in respect of lost income from a job (or self-employment) that he 
or she would have held during the period if the accident had not occurred57. 
If, at the end of the school year in which a minor turns 16, he or she cannot 
return to school or hold employment, the minor is entitled to an income 
replacement indemnity based on a gross income equal to the industrial 
53. Id., s. 100. 
54. Id., s. 101. 
55. Id., s. 70 (1). Subsection 87 (2) explains when a student is considered to be attending 
school on a full-time basis. For example, if a person is accepted for admission by a 
university in March, he or she is considered to be a student at that point, even though 
he or she will not begin attending classes until September. 
56. Id., s. 94. The elementary level is kindergarten to Grade VIII : Id., s. 93 (b). 
57. Id., s. 95(1). 
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average wage (which is currently $26 599.04 per year)58. Where a minor is 
able to resume his or her studies after an accident but cannot, because of the 
accident, hold employment after completing or ending those studies, he or 
she is entitled to a fixed indemnity for any missed school years and then to 
an income replacement indemnity based on a gross income equal to the 
industrial average wage59. 
A student is also entitled to a fixed indemnity if he or she is unable to 
begin or complete a school year or a term at the post-secondary level. The 
amount of the indemnity is $6 300 (currently $6 705 after indexation) for 
each school year not completed at the secondary level and $6 300 (currently 
$6 705) for each term not completed at the post-secondary level, to a maxi-
mum of $12 600 (currently $13 410) per year60. A student is also entitled to 
an income replacement indemnity in respect of lost income from a job (or 
self-employment) that he or she would have held during the period if the 
accident had not occurred61. After the date scheduled at the time of the 
accident for the completion of the student's studies, he or she is entitled to 
received an income replacement indemnity based on a gross income equal 
to the industrial average wage for so long as he or she is unable to begin or 
continue the studies or to hold employment62. If a student is able to resume 
his or her studies after an accident but cannot, because of the accident, hold 
employment after completing or ending those studies, he or she is entitled 
to a fixed indemnity for any missed school years or terms and, after the 
scheduled day for completion of the program of studies, to an income 
replacement indemnity based on a gross income equal to the industrial 
average wage63. 
2.2.1.3 Persons not capable of employment 
No income replacement indemnity is paid to a victim who is regularly 
incapable before the accident of holding employment64. 
58. Id., s. 96. The «industrial average wage» is the industrial aggregate average weekly 
earnings for all employees for Manitoba as published monthly by Statistics Canada : Id., 
s. 70 (2). 
59. Id., s. 97. 
60. Id., s. 88. «Secondary level» means Grades IX to XII: Id., s. 87 (1). 
61. Id., s. 89. 
62. Id., s. 90. 
63. Id., s. 91. 
64. Id., s. 105. 
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2.2.1.4 End of entitlement to income replacement indemnity 
When a victim who, at the time of the accident, was less than 65 years 
of age reaches the age of 66, his or her income replacement indemnity is 
reduced by 25 % each year until it ceases at the age of 6965. 
An income replacement indemnity ceases of course when the victim is 
able to hold the employment which he or she held at the time of the 
accident66. However, there will often be cases where the victim has in fact 
lost that job as a result of the accident and, although capable of returning to 
work, has no job to which to return. In those cases, the income replacement 
indemnity is extended for a further period of time, in order to assist the 
victim while he or she is seeking a new employment. The income replace-
ment indemnity is extended for a period of time which varies according to 
the period of the victim's incapacity : the indemnity is extended for 30 days 
if the incapacity lasted 90 to 180 days, for 90 days if the incapacity lasted for 
181 days to one year, 180 days if the incapacity lasted for more than one year 
but not more than 2 years, and one year if the incapacity lasted for more than 
two years67. 
A victim may also be able to return to work, but only at a lesser rate of 
remuneration. In that case, the victim is allowed to retain a part of his or her 
income replacement indemnity. The indemnity is reduced by 75 % of the net 
income earned from the employment68. This provides the victim with an 
incentive to return to the workforce69. 
If a victim suffers a relapse within two years of the accident or the last 
period for which the victim received an income replacement indemnity, the 
65. Id,, s. 104. 
66. Id., s. 110(1) (a). 
67. Id., s. 110 (2). This extended income replacement indemnity is available only to full-time 
and part-time earners. 
68. Id,, s. 116. 
69. The following example is illustrative. A victim is injured in an accident on January 1. 
Because of the injuries, he or she cannot continue his or her job as a machinist for 6 
months. His or her gross income was $3 000 per month and net income was $2 000 per 
month ; as a result, he or she is entitled to an income replacement indemnity of $1 800 
per month (90 % of $2 000). On April 1, the victim obtains a job as a custodian, with a 
gross income of $2 500 per month and a net income of $1 600 per month. As a result, 
between April 1 and the victim's return to his or her job as a machinist on July 1, the 
victim's income replacement indemnity would be reduced by 75 % of $1 600 or $1 200. 
Thus, the victim would receive an income replacement indemnity of $600 ($1 800 less 
$1 200). As a result, the victim would be receiving a net income of $1 600 per month 
from the employment and an income replacement indemnity of $600 per month for a 
total of $2 200 Working at the less remunerative job until the victim is able to return to 
the machinist's job on July 1 is more advantageous than staying at home 
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victim will be compensated as if there had been no interruption in compen-
sation70. However, if at the time of the relapse, the victim was earning a 
gross income greater than that previously used by the Corporation, the 
victim is entitled to an indemnity based on the greater amount71. If a victim 
suffers a relapse more than two years later, the relapse is considered to be a 
new accident and the victim is compensated on the basis of his or her 
situation at the time of the relapse72. However, there is no seven day waiting 
period for the new income replacement indemnity73. 
Income replacement indemnities cannot be accumulated. A person 
who is receiving an income replacement indemnity cannot receive another 
in respect of a new accident or a relapse. In that case, the victim will receive 
whichever income replacement indemnity is the greater74. 
2.2.2 Compensation for Permanent Impairment 
A lump sum indemnity is paid for any permanent physical impairment 
suffered by an accident victim. The Corporation must evaluate a victim's 
permanent impairment according to a schedule of impairments set out in 
regulation and determine the percentage applicable to it75. The percentage 
so determined is then applied to the maximum indemnity and the result is 
the amount of the compensation payable to the victim76. The maximum 
indemnity payable for a permanent impairment is $100 000 (currently 
$106 429) and the minimum is $500 (currently $532)77. 
No payment for permanent impairment is made if the victim dies as a 
result of the accident. In that case, lump sum death benefits, described 
below, are paid. If a victim dies as a result of a cause unrelated to the 
accident, the Corporation must estimate the degree of the permanent im-
pairment suffered by the victim in the accident and pay compensation for 
the impairment accordingly78. 
No compensation is paid in respect of a temporary impairment (except, 
of course, to the extent that the temporary impairment results in a loss of 
income, in which case an income replacement indemnity is payable). 
70. Id., s. 117(1). 
71. Id., s. 117(2). 
72. Id., s. 117(3). 
73. Id., s. 152 (2). 
74. Id., s. 118. 
75. Id., s. 129 ; Permanent tmpairments (Universal Bodily Injury Compensation) )egulation, 
M.R. 41/94. 
76. Id., s. 130. 
77. Id., s. 127. 
78. Id., s. 128. 
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2.2.3 Reimbursement of Expenses 
Every victim is entitled to reimbursement of all medical costs incurred 
because of the accident, to the extent that he or she is not entitled to 
reimbursement under the provincial medicare plan or under any other 
statute79. The Act also identifies a number of other expenses for which 
reimbursement will be made ; the major categories are described below. 
Where, as a result of the accident, a victim is unable to care for himself 
or herself or to perform the essential activities of everyday life without 
assistance, the cost of personal home assistance may be reimbursed to a 
maximum of $3 000 (currently $3 193) per month80. 
Reimbursement is paid for the loss of the contribution of a family 
member to a family enterprise (such as a business or a farm). Where a victim 
was working without remuneration in a family enterprise at the time of the 
accident and, as a result of the accident, is unable to perform his or her 
regular duties, reimbursement of expenses incurred to have the duties 
performed during the first 180 days after the accident will be paid up to $500 
(currently $532) per week81. This recognizes that, in these circumstances, 
the victim is probably a non-earner (or possibly a student or a minor) and so 
not entitled to an income replacement indemnity during this period. 
A part-time earner or a non-earner whose main occupation at the time 
of the accident is taking care, without remuneration, of a minor or another 
person in need of care is entitled to receive a weekly indemnity for as long 
as he or she is unable to care for that person. The amount of the indemnity 
is dependent upon the number of persons cared for, ranging from $290 for 
one person to $380 for four or more persons (the current range is $309 to 
$404)82. As noted earlier, after the first 180 days after the accident, a 
part-time earner and a non-earner are entitled to receive an income replace-
ment indemnity based on an employment determined by the Corporation. 
However, if it is to his or her advantage, a part-time earner or a non-earner 
79. Id., s. 136. This includes transportation and lodging for the purpose of receiving medical 
care and the purchase of prostheses or orthopedic devices. Reimbursement is subject to 
the Reimbursement of Expenses (Universal Bodily Injury Compensation) Regulation, 
M.R. 40/94 as am. by M.R. 92/95 [hereinafter Reimbursement of Expenses Regulation]. 
Reimbursement under the provincial medicare plan is made pursuant to The Health 
Services Insurance Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. H35. 
80. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 131. Subject to the maximum 
amount, expenses for personal home assistance are reimbursed in accordance with 
regulation : Reimbursement of Expenses Regulation, supra, note 79, s. 2 and Schedule 
A. 
81. Id., s. 135. 
82. Id., s. 132. 
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who is receiving a weekly indemnity for the care of another may elect to 
continue to receive that indemnity instead of receiving the income replace-
ment indemnity based on the determined employment. The Corporation 
must provide information to assist the part-time earner or non-earner in 
making the election83. 
A victim who becomes unable to care for a minor or another person in 
need of care is entitled to reimbursement of care costs which are incurred 
by reason of the accident (for example, there would be no reimbursement 
for day care costs for a child which the victim had been incurring before the 
accident during his or her working hours ; this would have to be borne from 
the victim's income replacement indemnity ; however, there would be reim-
bursement for the cost of caring for the child during evenings and weekends 
if, for example, the victim were hospitalized and could not provide the care 
personally). The maximum amount of the reimbursement ranges from $75 
per week where one person is cared for to $150 per week where four or more 
persons are cared for (the current range is $80 to $160). This reimbursement 
is available only where the victim does not reside with a spouse or, where 
the victim does reside with a spouse, the spouse is also unable to provide 
the care because of his or her illness or disability or work or studies outside 
the residence. This reimbursement is not available to a part-time earner or 
a non-earner who is receiving the weekly indemnity for the care of 
another84 
The Corporation may reimburse the transportation, lodging and other 
expenses incurred by a person who must accompany a victim to obtain 
medical care (such as a parent accompanying a young child)85. 
2.2.4 Rehabilitation 
Although it is referred to in only one section of the Act, rehabilitation 
of accident victims is given considerable emphasis by the plan. The Corpo-
ration is given broad powers to promote the rehabilitation of victims, « to 
lessen a disability resulting from bodily injury, and to facilitate the victim's 
return to a normal life or reintegration into society or the labour market86 ». 
For example, the Corporation may provide funds for the adaptation of a 
motor vehicle to the needs of the victim, the relocation or alteration of the 
victim's primary residence, the purchase of mobility, communication, learn-
ing or homemaking aides and « for occupational, educational or vocational 
83. Id., s. 133. 
84. Id., s. 134. 
85. Id., s. 137. 
86. Id., s. 138. 
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rehabilitation that is consistent with the victim's occupation before the 
accident and his or her skills and abilities after the accident, and that could 
return the victim as nearly as practicable to his or her condition before the 
accident or improve his or her earning capacity and level of inde-
pendence87 ». 
2.2.5 Death Benefits 
Lump sum indemnities are paid to the spouse and dependants of a 
victim who dies as a result of an automobile accident. « Spouse » means a 
person who was married to and cohabited with the victim at the time of the 
accident or a person of the opposite sex who cohabited with the victim in a 
conjugal relationship continuously for at least five years immediately pre-
ceding the accident or, where there is a child of the union, for at least one 
year immediately preceding the accident. « Dependant » includes a spouse, 
a person married to but separated from the victim, an ex-spouse entitled to 
support under a judgment or agreement, minor children and adult children 
or parents who were substantially dependent on the victim at the time of the 
accident88. 
The death benefit paid to the spouse of a deceased victim is based on 
the gross income that would have been used to compute an income replace-
ment indemnity had the victim survived the accident and been unable to 
hold employment. The death benefit is determined by multiplying that 
amount by a factor set out in Schedule 1 to the Act89. The factor varies 
according to the age of the victim at the time of the accident ; the factor 
begins at 1.0 for victims aged 25 years or under, rises by 0.2 for each year 
until it reaches a peak of 5.0 at the age of 45 and then falls again by 0.2 each 
year until it again reaches 1.0 for victims aged 65 years of older on the day 
of death90. A somewhat more generous scale (Schedule 2 to the Act) is used 
where the spouse of the deceased victim was disabled at the time of the 
87. Reimbursement of Expenses Regulation, supra, note 79, s. 10 (1). 
88. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 70 ( 1 ). « [A] person who would dave 
been a dependant of the victim if the victim had held employment at the time of the 
accident is deemed to be a dependant of the victim even if the victim did not hold 
employment at that time» : Id., s. 119 (2). 
89. Id., s. 120(1). 
90. For example : At the time of his or her death at the age of 40 in an accident, a victim 
had a gross income of $35 000. A surviving spouse is entitled to a death benefit equal to 
the gross income of $35 000 multiplied by the factor in Schedule 1 (4.0) : $140 000. 
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accident91. That scale begins at a multiplier of 5.0 for victims aged 45 years 
or under and then falls by 0.2 for each year until it reaches 1.0 for victims 
aged 65 years or over at the time of the accident. In any case, the minimum 
death benefit payable to the spouse of a deceased victim is $40 000 (cur-
rently $42 572)92. 
A dependant other than the spouse is entitled to a lump sum death 
benefit based on his or her age on the day of the victim's death. The amount 
of the benefit begins at $35 000 for dependants less than one year old at the 
time of the victim's death and decreases by $1 000 per year until it reaches 
a benefit of $ 19 000 for dependants aged 16 years of age or more ((he amount 
of the benefit currently runs from $37 250 to $20 221)93. A dependant who is 
disabled receives an additional lump sum indemnity of $17 500 (currently 
$ 18 625), irrespective of age94. 
If a deceased victim has no spouse but has dependant children, then the 
children are entitled to the lump sum death benefit described above and are 
also entitled to share the lump sum indemnity which a spouse would have 
received95. 
Where a deceased victim has no dependants, each child and parent of 
the victim is entitled to a lump sum death benefit of $5 000 (currently 
$5 321)96. Finally, the estate of a deceased victim is entitled to a lump sum 
amount of $3 500 (currently $3 725) for funeral expenses97. 
All amounts payable in respect of the death of a victim are normally 
paid by way of a lump sum. However, at the request of a dependant, these 
amounts can be paid by periodic instalments over a period of up to 
20 years98. 
91. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 120 (1). A person is considered to 
be disabled if he or she is « unable to hold any substantially gainful employment because 
of a physical or mental disability that is likely to be of indefinite duration or result in 
death» : Id.,s. 119(1). 
92. Id., s. 120 (2). For example: A victim dies in an accident at the age of 60; prior to the 
accident, the victim earned $10000 per year. Applying the factor in Schedule 1, the 
surviving spouse would be entitled to a death benefit of $20 000 ($10 000 x 2.0) ; however, 
the surviving spouse would receive the minimum death benefit, currently $42 572. 
93. Id., s. 121 (2) (a) and Schedule 3. 
94. Id., s. 121 (2) (b). 
95. Id,, s. 122. 
96. Id,, s. 123. 
97. Id,, s. 124. 
98. Id,, s. 125. 
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2.3 Claims for Compensation 
A claim for compensation must be made within two years after the day 
of the accident ; where symptoms are not immediately apparent, the two 
year limitation runs from the day when they are first observed by a medical 
practitioner. A claim for death benefits must be made within two years after 
the victim's death. A claim by a minor must be made within two years after 
his or her 18th birthday. In any case, the Corporation has the discretion to 
extend a time limit if it is satisfied that the claimant has a reasonable excuse 
for failing to make the claim in time". 
A claimant must provide the Corporation with any information needed 
by it to assess the victim's claim100. At the request of the Corporation, a 
claimant must undergo a medical examination by a medical practitioner 
chosen by the claimant. The Corporation may also require the claimant to 
be examined by a practitioner chosen by the Corporation101. The Cor-
poration is entitled to a written report of any such medical examination and, 
at the request of the claimant, it must provide a copy to any practitioner 
named by the claimant102. The Corporation is also entitled to receive reports 
from other practitioners or hospitals that treat the claimant after the acci-
dent103. If a claimant chooses to obtain further medical reports to support 
an application for review or an appeal, the claimant must do so at his or her 
own expense. However, if the application for review or the appeal is suc-
cessful, the claimant is entitled to reimbursement to the maximum amount 
specified in the regulations104. 
An employer or former employer must provide the Corporation with 
proof of the earnings of a claimant within six days of the Corporation's 
written request105. 
Claimants must keep the Corporation fully informed of any change in 
their condition or in their situation which might affect their entitlement to 
an indemnity106. However, the Corporation has a corresponding obligation : 
it has a duty to ensure that claimants receive all the compensation to which 
99. Id., s. .11. 
100. Id., s. 142. 
101. Id., s. 144. 
102. Id., s. 146. 
103. Id., s. 147. 
104. Id., s. 148. The maximum amount is $250 or, where the claimant is jointly examined by 
more than one practitioner, $250 for each practitioner to a maximum of three prac-
titioners : Reimbursement of Expenses Regulation, supra, note 79, s. 43. 
105. Id., s. 143. 
106. Id., s. 149. 
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they are entitled107. Furthermore, a claimant is entitled to examine and copy 
any document in the Corporation's possession respecting the claim108. 
A number of other provisions in the Act are aimed at permitting the 
Corporation to respond quickly and generously to the needs of an accident 
victim. For example, if an application for compensation appears to be 
well-founded, the Corporation may begin to pay an indemnity or reimburse 
an expense even though it has not yet made a final decision respecting the 
claim ; such payments are not recoverable by the Corporation unless they 
are obtained by fraud109. The Corporation has discretion to capitalize an 
income replacement indemnity and pay it to a victim where the amount to 
be paid in periodic instalments is very small or where the victim does not 
reside in Manitoba (recognizing that there may be difficulties in admin-
istering such payments)110. The reimbursement of expenses may be made in 
instalments, rather than by lump sum, and may, at the request of the victim, 
be paid directly to the person to whom it is owed111. A victim continues to 
receive an indemnity even though he or she has applied for a review of the 
Corporation's decision or has appealed to the Accident Injury Compensa-
tion Appeal Commission112. The Corporation may make a new decision in 
respect of a claimant at any time when new information becomes available 
(for example a change in the claimant's condition or situation). The Corpo-
ration may also reconsider a decision before a claimant applies for a review 
of a decision or appeals a review decision if the Corporation has made an 
error113 
The Corporation may refuse to pay compensation and may reduce, 
suspend or terminate the compensation in a number of situations. These 
situations generally involve dishonest or obstructive claimants and include 
refusing, without valid reason, to return to a former employment, to take a 
new employment, to take a recommended medical treatment or to partici-
pate in a rehabilitation program made available by the Corporation and 
preventing or delaying recovery by his or her activities114. 
Compensation other than an income replacement indemnity is exempt 
from garnishment and seizure and may not be assigned to another person. 
An income replacement indemnity is treated as wages for the purposes of 
107. Id., s. 150. 
108. Id., s. 151. 
109. Id., s. 153. 
110. Id., s. 154. 
111. Id., s. 155. 
112. Id., s. 157. 
113. Id., s. 171. 
114. Id., s. 160. 
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garnishment and assignment and is therefore subject to the rules and exemp-
tions set out for wages in The Garnishment Act and The Law of Property 
Act of Manitoba"5 . 
2.4 Indexation for Inflation 
As has already been noted at several points in this paper, compensation 
under the Act is indexed for inflation. The gross annual income upon which 
an income replacement indemnity is based is indexed each year on the 
anniversary of the day of the accident (or, in the case of a victim for whom 
an employment has been determined, on the anniversary of the day the 
employment was determined). It should be noted that it is not the income 
replacement indemnity which is indexed, but rather the gross annual income 
upon which the indemnity is based. This ensures that, although the victim is 
protected from the effects of inflation, he or she is not insulated from 
changes in taxation legislation. Thus, an increase in premiums under the 
Canada Pension Plan would have a negative impact on a victim (by reducing 
his or her net income and thus his or her income replacement indemnity), 
just as it would have had if the victim were in the work force. All of the 
specific dollar amounts which are set out in the Act and in Schedule 3 of the 
Act (lump sum indemnity to the dependants of deceased victims) are also 
adjusted on March 1 of each year116. 
Indexation is based on the Consumer Price Index published by Statis-
tics Canada"7 . However, the amount of adjustment for inflation is limited 
to 6 % per year unless the Corporation, by regulation, sets a higher rate of 
indexation"8 . 
The Act provides that the adjustment in the amount of benefits as a 
result of indexation for inflation is to have no effect on the amount of 
compensation paid to a victim under a private insurance scheme119. 
2.5 Review and Appeal 
All decisions respecting entitlement to universal bodily injury compen-
sation are to be made by the Corporation and these powers may be dele-
115. Id.,s. 159. See The Garnishment Act, R.S.M. 1987,c.G20 and The Law ofProperty Act, 
R.S.M. 1987, c. L90, s. 32. 
116. Id., s. 165. 
117. Id., s. 164 and 166. As noted earlier, the maximum yearly insurable earnings is indexed 
according to changes in the industrial average wage : Id., s. 114 (2) to (4). 
118. Id., s. 167. Inflation to date has of course been well below the 6% cap. 
119. Id.,s. 168. 
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gated to its employees120. However, the Act also contains a number of 
important procedural safeguards to ensure accountability, transparency and 
fairness. 
Decisions made by the Corporation must be given to the claimant in 
writing and must include reasons for the decision121. When giving notice of 
a decision, the Corporation must also give notice of the right to apply for a 
review of the decision122. 
A claimant has 60 days in which to apply in writing to the Corporation 
for an internal review of a decision made by it123. On a review, the Corpora-
tion has full powers to change a decision and must provide written reasons 
for its review decision124. It also must give notice of the claimant's right to 
appeal the review decision to the Automobile Injury Compensation Appeal 
Commission125. 
A claimant has 90 days to appeal a review decision to the Automobile 
Injury Compensation Appeal Commission126. The Commission is a special-
ist tribunal created by the Act for the purpose of hearing appeals in respect 
of universal bodily injury compensation127. It is comprised of three full-time 
commissioners and one part-time commissioner, all of whom are appointed 
by the provincial government128. 
120. Id., s. 169. The Corporation and its employees cannot be sued for the performance of 
their duties under the Act, so long as they have acted in good faith ; they cannot be 
required to testify in a lawsuit in respect of information which they have obtained in the 
course of their duties (such as information about a claimant's income) : Id., s. 199. 
121. Id., s. 170(1). 
122. Id., s. 170 (2). 
123. Id., s. 172 (1). The Corporation may extend the deadllne «if ii ts satisfied that the claimant 
has a reasonable excuse for failing to appeal within that time»: Id., s. 172 (2). The 
procedure to be followed on an application for review is set out in regulation : Rules of 
Procedure (Universal Bodily Injury Compensation) Regulation, M.R. 38/94. 
124. Id., s. 173. 
125. Id., s. 170(3). 
126. Id., s. 174. The Commission may extend the deadline as it sees fit. « Claimants who have 
furnished persuasive reasons for missing the 90 day deadline have been granted exten-
sions by the Commission. The Commission will continue to consider reasonable re-
quests. » : MANITOBA, AUTOMOBILE INJURY COMPENSATION APPEAL COMMISSION, An-
nual Report for the Fiscal Year 1996/97, p. 2 [hereinaffer : : Appeal Commissson AAnual 
Report»]. 
127. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 175. 
128. The Commission also has a director, an appeals officer, a secretary to the chief com-
missioner and a secretary-receptionist : Appeal Commission Annual Report, op. cit., note 
126, p. 1. The chief commissioner is appointed for a term of five to seven years and the 
other commissioners are appointed for terms of three years ; commissioners may not be 
dismissed except for cause : The Manitoba Public Insurance Act, s. 176. 
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After giving reasonable notice, the Commission must hold a hearing in 
respect of an appeal. Unless there is a good reason for not doing so, the 
appeal is open to the public. The parties must be given a full opportunity to 
present evidence and make submissions. However, the Commission deter-
mines its own practice and procedure129 and is not bound by the rules of 
evidence130. Technical irregularities and lack of formality do not invalidate 
proceedings before the Commission131. The members of the Commission 
have the powers of commissioners under Part V of The Manitoba Evidence 
Act132 and so may, for example, subpoena witnesses. The Commission may 
carry out investigations and obtain expert opinions133. Parties to the appeal 
must have a reasonable opportunity to examine all material filed with the 
Commission that is relevant to the appeal134. 
The Commission may confirm, vary or rescind a review decision of the 
Corporation and may substitute its discretion for that of the Corporation. 
Written notice of the Commission's decision must be given to the parties as 
soon as reasonably practicable and the parties must be advised of their right 
to apply to The Court of Appeal for permission to appeal on a question of 
jurisdiction or law. At the request of one of the parties, the Commission 
must also give written reasons for its decision135. 
An application for leave to appeal must be made within 30 days after 
receipt of a copy of the decision of the Commission, unless a judge of The 
Court of Appeal extends the time limit. An appeal from a decision of the 
Commission stays that decision, unless a judge of The Court of Appeal 
orders otherwise. The Court of Appeal may substitute its own decision for 
that of the Commission or may refer the matter back to the Commission136. 
Although a number of applications for leave to appeal to The Court of 
Appeal have been made, none has been successful to date137. 
129. Id., s. 182. «On occasion, where an appellant lives or works some distance out of 
Winnipeg, the commissioners have, with the prior approval of the parties, conducted a 
hearing telephonically, using a 'speaker-phone' in the hearing room to enable complete 
communication between all interested persons [...] If, in the course of a telephone hearing, 
it becomes apparent that the Commission needs actually to see one or more witnesses, 
the matter will be adjourned to the earliest practicable date for that purpose » : Appeal 
Commission Annual Report, op. cit., note 126, p. 2. 
130. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 183 (2). 
131. Id.,s. 183(7). 
132. Id., s. 183(1). 
133. Id., s. 183(4). 
134. Id., s. 183 (6). 
135. Id., s. 184. 
136. Id., s. 187. The Commission may also state a case in writing to The Court of Appeal for 
an opinion on a question of law or jurisdiction : Id., s. 186. 
137. APPEAL COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT, op. cit., note 126, p. 3. 
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Where, on a review or an appeal, an indemnity or expense which has 
already been paid is cancelled or reduced, the Corporation is not permitted 
to recover any amounts paid before that decision, unless the payment was 
obtained by fraud138. 
Although the Act appears to grant the Commission considerable discre-
tion, it is significantly circumscribed by the specificity of the Act. Like the 
Corporation, the Commission may not diverge from the central elements of 
the universal bodily injury compensation plan mandated by the Act. For 
example, it may not decide that the circumstances of a particular victim 
warrant a higher income replacement indemnity than would otherwise be 
payable ; like the Corporation, the Commission may authorize the payment 
of no more than is contemplated by the Act. The Commission might feel that 
the amount permitted by the Act for funeral expenses is inadequate in light 
of the cultural customs of a particular victim ; nonetheless, the Commission 
has no power to go beyond the specific amounts permitted by the Act. The 
Commission may only exercise discretion in the limited areas where the Act 
allows for discretion. The following two cases reported in the Commission's 
last annual report are illustrative : 
An appellant sought payment for the cost of a new mattress, box spring and 
delivery charges plus taxes thereon. The appellant's physician had recommended 
that he purchase a mattress of the type in question. MPI's position was that beds 
and mattresses would only be considered in cases where a demonstrated medical 
or physiological need existed —for example, paraplegia, quadriplegia or a persist-
ent vegetated state. The Commission disagreed with MPI, holding that if, in light of 
all circumstances, there was a strong likelihood that the items in question would 
materially improve the victim's chances of recovery and if the item was 'medically 
required', then it was reasonable for the Corporation's discretion to be exercised 
in favour of the victim. As a result, MPI was ordered to reimburse the appellant for 
the cost of the mattress only (the box spring was not found necessary for his 
rehabilitation) after deducting a percentage, determined by the Commission, for the 
perceived 'betterment' in the anticipated lifespan of his bedding139. 
An appellant, injured in Manitoba but now resident in Alberta, had been referred 
by his chiropractor to a registered massage therapist in Alberta. The therapist was 
highly qualified in her field, being an instructor in advanced techniques in rehabili-
tative therapy — a course offered for upgrading purposes to physiotherapists, 
nurses and massage therapists across Canada and in the United States. The thera-
pist was also massage therapist to the members of Swim Canada's National Team 
for the Pan Pacific, World and Olympic competition. She was not, however, an 
athletic therapist and the claimant's application for reimbursement for massage 
therapy expenses were therefore denied by MPI. Because Section 8 of Regulation 
40/94 limits payment for massage therapy to that which is «dispensed by a 
138. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 190. 
139. Appeal Commission Annual Report, op. cit., note 126, p. 4. 
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physician, chiropractor, physiotherapist or athletic therapist » the Commission felt 
obliged to deny the appeal and confirm the decision of MPI140. 
The success rate of appellants is not very high. « Of the 64 appeals 
heard and decided by the Commission for the [1996/97] fiscal year [...], 24 of 
them (or 38 %) were successful in whole or in part141 ». The limited jurisdic-
tion of the Appeal Commission also contributes to the relatively low 
number of appeals which it hears. In its third year in operation, the Commis-
sion received 92 notices of appeal142 and it anticipates that « in due course, 
the number of Notices of Appeal filed in any given year will reach a plateau 
in the region of 200143 ». 
2.6 Compensation under other Acts or plans 
The Act recognizes that automobile accident victims may also be 
entitled to compensation from other sources and provides for its interaction 
with those other forms of compensation. 
An income replacement indemnity is to be reduced by any disability 
benefit which the victim receives as a result of the accident under the 
Canada Pension Plan or any similar program in a jurisdiction outside of 
Manitoba (such as the Quebec Pension Plan) other than the Unemployment 
Insuranee Act14.. However, compensation under the Act does not affect the 
right to claim compensation under a private insurance scheme145. 
Where, as a result of an accident in the course of employment, a person 
is entitled to compensation under the Act and to compensation under The 
Workess Compensation Act4i6, the person may elect to be compensated 
under one or the other ; once compensation is elected under one, the entitle-
ment to compensation under the other is extinguished147. The Act also 
recognizes that a person receiving compensation under the Act for an 
automobile accident may be subsequently injured and become eligible for 
compensation under The Workers Compensation Act ; similarly, a person 
who was injured in a workplace and is receiving compensation under The 
140. Id., p. 3. 
141. Id., p. 5. 
142. Id., p. 1. 
143. Id., p. 5. 
144. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 197 as amended by The Manitoba 
Public Insurance Corporation Amendment Act, S.M. 1996, c. 11, s. 3. 
145. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 194. 
146. The Workers Compensation Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. W200. 
147. The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, s. 195. Where the person chooses 
compensation under The Workers Compensation Act, any lawsuits which might be 
permissible under that Act against a driver at fault are barred. 
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Workers Compensation Act may subsequently become injured in an auto-
mobile accident and become eligible for universal bodily injury compensa-
tion. In those cases, the Corporation and the Workers Compensation Board 
must make a joint decision distinguishing between the bodily injury attrib-
utable to the automobile accident and the bodily injury attributable to the 
workplace accident and pay compensation in that proportion. That joint 
decision may be appealed by the injured person either under The Workers 
Compensation Act or to the Automobile Injury Compensation Appeal 
Commission148. 
Conclusion : Mandatory Review of the Legislation 
During the Legislative Committee hearings on the proposed legislation 
to introduce the no-fault automobile injury plan, the following provision 
was added : 
The minister shall, within three years after the coming into force of this Part, 
undertake a comprehensive review of the operation of this Part involving public 
representations and shall, within one year after the review is undertaken or within 
such further time as the Assembly may allow, submit to the Assembly a report on 
the operation of the review149. 
In April 1997, the provincial government appointed the Honourable 
Sam Uskiw, a former provincial cabinet minister, as head of the PIPP 
Review Commission to carry out this review. According to advertisements 
placed by the Review Commission, its mandate is « to determine if the Plan 
is meeting its objectives». These objectives were stated in terms which 
reflect the overriding goal of the plan at its inception in 1993, the achieve-
ment of rate stability ; these objectives were described in the advertisement 
as being « to guarantee compensation for all automobile accident victims 
based on financial loss and injury, stabilizing both claim costs and premi-
ums150». In other words, the Review Commission was not asked to com-
ment on the advisability of a compensation plan based on no-fault princi-
ples, but rather on the effectiveness of the operation of such a plan. 
The Review Commission held public meetings in 20 centres across the 
province between June 24 and September 4, 1997. At the end of 1997, Mr. 
Uskiw's Review Commission had submitted its report to the Minister 
responsible for The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act ; however, 
the report had not yet been released to the public. The report of the Review 
148. Id., s. 196. The appeal must be made within 90 days of receiving notice of the decision 
« or within such further time as the body to which the appeal is made may allow » : Id., 
s. 196 (2). 
149. Id., s. 203. 
150. Advertisement, The Winnipeg Sun (June 15, 1997) 13. 
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Commission, once released, will no doubt foretell the next developments in 
automobile accident insurance in Manitoba. 
Addendum 
Subsequent to the completion of this paper, the report of the Personal 
Injury Protection Plan Review Commission151 was released to the public. 
This addendum provides a brief overview of the report. 
As stated in the paper, the mandate of the PIPP Review Commission 
was to determine whether the no-fault plan is meeting its objectives. 
The objectives of PIPP, as provided by the government, are to : 
Reduce the level of year-over-year rate increases by stabilizing bodily injury claim 
costs ; 
Increase the amount of money available to compensate seriously injured accident 
victims for economic loss by eliminating payments for non-economic losses such 
as pain and suffering, and by reducing legal and other costs associated with tort 
claims ; 
Provide more timely injury claim payments through the elimination of time-con-
suming litigation over accident responsibility and amount of damages ; 
Guarantee that all accident victims receive payments for economic loss by elimi-
nating fault as a criterion for compensation ; 
Provide an effective appeal process to ensure all accident victims receive the 
compensation to which they are entitled under the Plan152. 
The Review Commission also chose to consider two further issues : 
The adequacy of coverage for medical rehabilitation and other expenses ; 
Whether the system is humane, fair and equitable153. 
The report of the Review Commission concludes that « the PIPP pro-
gram has met its mandate by providing insurance coverage for all Manito-
bans, stabilizing rates and guaranteeing compensation for all injured peo-
ple154 ». In particular, it notes that : 
Autopac premiums have continued to rise since the inception of PIPP, primarily 
due to increased collision claim costs. However the premium increases would have 
been substantially greater if the bodily injury claim costs had not been reduced 
through the implementation of PIPP. The estimated increase in premium levels 
would have been well in excess of 30 per cent since the implementation of PIPP. 
This translates to an estimated saving of almost $200 per vehicle in 1996155. 
151. PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION PLAN REVIEW COMMISSION, Report of the Personal 
Injury Protection Plan Review Commission (1997), Winnipeg, Government of Manitoba 
[hereinafter Uskiw Report]. 
152. Id., p. 8. 
153. USKIW REPORT, p. 8. 
154. USKIW REPORT, p. 6. 
155. USKIW REPORT, p. 4. 
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However, the report also notes « certain weaknesses and inequities in 
the legislation and administration of PIPP »l56 and makes 54 recommenda-
tions for change. The Manitoba government has announced its intention to 
accept 30 of these recommendations, to give further study to another 19 and 
to decline 5 of the recommendations157. 
The report recommends (and the government has accepted) that limits 
on income replacement indemnities for victims over the age of 65 should be 
removed and that a victim should receive full income replacement indem-
nity until the age of 69 (the age at which « federal income tax law requires 
that RRSP accounts be matured and annuitized or transferred to a 
RRIF158»). 
[T]he Corporation [should] undertake a study with a view to establishing a life 
income entitlement to I.R.I, [income replacement indemnity] for victims whose 
income and other means do not permit them to provide for their own retirement on 
attaining 69 years of age159. 
The maximum amount payable for funeral expenses should be in-
creased to $6 000 and the cost of grief counselling should be reimbursed. 
« The grid schedules that determine the need for personal and home care 
[should] be reviewed by an independent consultant in order to ensure they 
are more complete and less subjective160». Furthermore, the report recom-
mends « [t]hat all benefit levels be reviewed by the Corporation to ensure 
that they are fair and reasonable, taking into account current economic 
conditions and inflation and that the Corporation report on the review to its 
Board161 ». 
The bulk of the remaining recommendations made by the report and 
accepted by the government relate to improving the level of service pro-
vided by the Corporation to claimants. According to the report, « [t]he 
Corporation should direct much more effort in ensuring that all MPI em-
ployees serve all Manitobans in a fair and equitable manner162 ». The report 
recommends that « a Statement of Claimant's Rights and Benefits be given 
156. USKIW REPORT, p. 6. 
157. At the same time as the release of the Uskiw Report, the Manitoba government also 
released three informal, unpublished documents entitled «Recommendations Ac-
cepted », « Recommendations for Further Consideration » and « Recommendations De-
clined ». Each consists of a table with three columns : the first summarizes the relevant 
recommendations, the second summarizes the current law or situation and the third sets 
out comments. 
158. USKIW REPORT, p. 52. 
159. USKIW REPORT, p. 73, Recommendation 4. 
160. USKIW REPORT, p. 77, Recommendation 28. 
161. USKIW REPORT, p. 79, Recommendation 42. 
162. USKIW REPORT, p. 70. 
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to the claimant at his or her first meeting with an adjuster163». Other 
recommendations relate to increasing the independence of the internal 
review of claims by the Corporation, increasing consultation with claimants 
and ensuring that the workloads of case managers allow them « to deal fairly 
and adequately with each of the claimants164». A number of other, more 
technical recommendations are also made165. 
The following are the more significant recommendations which were 
identified by the Manitoba government as requiring further study : 
7. That in the determination of net income for I.R.I, [income replacement 
indemnity] purposes, the adjustment for Canada Pension Plan and Employment 
Insurance contributions be eliminated. 
9. That in determining I.R.I., the income of part-time and seasonal workers not be 
annualized in calculating taxable income and income tax. 
12. That in calculating I.R.I., the Corporation take into account, the income 
earning potential of students, those just entering the workforce and those who were 
temporarily employed on a part-time or casual basis at the time of the injury. 
14. That the Permanent Impairment Schedules be revised to conform with the 
American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impair-
ment. 
15. That fibromyalgia and myofascial pain syndromes be added to the Permanent 
Impairment Schedule. 
31. That, when the Corporation requires a claimant to be examined by a practi-
tioner, the claimant shall choose from a panel of practitioners submitted by the 
appropriate governing body of the particular discipline. 
38. That a claimant have the right to be represented at the appeal [before the 
Automobile Injury Compensation Appeal Commission] by an advocate, paid for 
by the Corporation. 
41. That a notwithstanding power be granted to the Appeal Commission where 
the Commission would have within its sole discretion the power to grant compen-
sation to a claimant166. 
163. USKIW REPORT, p. 78, Recommendation 33. 
164. USKIW REPORT, p. 81, Recommendation 52. 
165. For example, recent changes to the Income Tax Act respecting alimony and maintenance 
payments should be recognized (Recommendation 8). The definition of part-time em-
ployment should be consistent with that used by Statistics Canada (Recommendation 
10). The Corporation should formalize its policies in taking account the business income 
earned in a business in which the claimant has an equity interest (Recommendation 13). 
No limit should be placed on the cost of repairing prostheses and orthopedic devices 
worn before the accident (Recommendation 24). The Corporation should pay expenses 
incurred by a victim for long distance telephone calls to make appointments to undergo 
a medical examination (Recommendation 27). The Corporation should have no discretion 
about reimbursement of expenses in installments when installments are required by the 
claimant (Recommendation 44). 
166. USKIW REPORT, pp. 74-79. 
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Other recommendations identified by the government as requiring 
further study generally relate to a reduction in the discretion available to the 
Corporation or are of a more technical nature167. 
The following recommendations were declined by the provincial gov-
ernment : 
1. That amendments be introduced to allow certain negligent third parties to be 
held accountable and bear the costs of their negligence themselves by allowing the 
victim and/or the Corporation the right to bring tort action for compensation. 
5. That the Income Replacement Indemnity of a victim be equal to 100 % of his 
or her net income. 
6. That the seven day exclusion period before the Income Replacement Indem-
nity begins be eliminated. 
20. That the expenses reimbursed by the Corporation which are not covered 
under the Health Services Insurance Act or any other Act, be extended to include 
hospital care and qualified massage therapy if prescribed by a physician, chiroprac-
tor, physiotherapist or athletic therapist. 
23. That the Corporation pay expenses for dental care, chiropractic treatment and 
physiotherapy for the victim in such amount as is medically necessary and pre-
scribed by a practitioner. 
The timing of the report's release precludes a detailed discussion of its 
recommendations ; however, it is possible to make a few general comments. 
First among these would be the observation that the Review Commission's 
report seems to be long on recommendations and short on reasons. The 
recommendation that « a notwithstanding power be granted to the Appeal 
Commission where the Commission would have within its sole discretion 
the power to grant compensation to a claimant168» is an example. This 
recommendation would seem to allow the Appeal Commission to award 
compensation other than or in excess of that permitted by the Act itself. 
Despite the significance of this recommendation, it does not appear in the 
main body of the report ; it appears only in the chapter summarizing the 
report's recommendations, without any discussion at all. 
The reports's recommendation that the schedule currently used for 
assessing permanent impairments be replaced with the American Medical 
167. For example, the Corporation « shall », rather than « may », reimburse those expenses 
specified under the Act and Regulations (Recommendation 17). The maximum expenses 
payable for non-discretionary out-of-province care should be such amount as is medi-
cally necessary and prescribed by a practitioner (Recommendation 22). The Corporation 
should reimburse for loss of wages due to time spent attending medical or rehabilitation 
appointments (Recommendation 19). The Corporation should be allowed to enter into 
structured settlements for lump sum payments when circumstances warrant (Recom-
mendation 49). 
168. USKIW REPORT, p. 79, Recommendation 41. 
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Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment is a 
further example. The justification for this recommendation is the bald 
assertion that 
Experience has indicated an inconsistency in awards with relative overpayment for 
some impairments and underpayment or no payment for others. There would be 
higher credibility in adopting an authoritatively created schedule. The American 
Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 
(Guides) is recognized as one of the authorities in the United States169. 
No evidence is given in the Review Commission's report of the nega-
tive experience which it says it found170. No evidence is given of the 
authoritativeness of the American Medical Association's Guides other than 
statements from the Guides itself. Even assuming the high quality of the 
Guides, there is no discussion of why it is superior to the schedule currently 
in use by MPI171. The report implies that use of the American Medical 
Association's Guides will result in a more individualized assessment of 
permanent impairments ; as the report notes (in bold print), « [n]o-fault 
equalizes the value of each person's body parts with no consideration of the 
victim's profession or lifestyle172». Use of the Guides is apparently pro-
posed as a solution to this problem. However, there is no discussion of the 
possibility that, by tying compensation for permanent impairment to the 
«restrictions or limitations imposed on the patient's ability to carry out 
daily activities, rather than [...] [to] a specific diagnosis173 », claimants might 
be encouraged to slow their recovery and be provided with an incentive not 
to participate meaningfully in rehabilitation. 
169. USKIW REPORT, p. 55. 
170. Appendix D of the report sets out «examples of what the public told the [Review] 
Commission » (USKIW REPORT, Appendix D, p. 2). Part of the Appendix sets out criti-
cisms respecting compensation for permanent impairment made at the public hearings 
held by the Review Commission (Appendix D, pp. 6-7). It may be that this is the basis 
of the negative experience which it reports ; however, this is not stated. Furthermore, 
the report contains no response from the Corporation and no indication that one was 
sought. If the Review Commission did receive a response from the Corporation, no 
indication is given of why the position of those who made presentations at the public 
hearings was preferred to that of the Corporation. 
171. The report seems to suggest that, by enabling physicians « to evaluate and report medical 
impairment in a standardized manner », « concerns expressed by claimants about differ-
ent diagnoses by their own practitioners and those working on behalf of MPI » would 
be resolved (USKIW REPORT, p. 56). Yet are practitioners not already using a standardized 
system, that is, the MPI schedule of permanent impairments ? There is no discussion of 
why the Guides would succeed as a standardized method of reporting where the MPI 
schedule has allegedly failed. 
172. USKIW REPORT, p. 55. 
173. USKIW REPORT, p. 56. 
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The recommendation that certain negligent third parties be held ac-
countable and bear the costs of their negligence themselves by allowing the 
victim and/or the Corporation the right to bring tort action for compensation 
is clearly a response to the McMillan case, discussed earlier in the paper. 
However, once again, little is given as a rationale for the recommendation 
and the reasons which are given suggest a lack of understanding of the 
philosophical underpinnings of the no-fault plan. A single reason is given for 
the recommendation : 
A related but less obvious result of the removal of the right to institute a tort action 
[...] is that an at-fault party who would otherwise have had to bear the cost of a tort 
settlement is equally removed from the financial burdens such actions can bring. 
The burden of relieving negligent third parties, who do not contribute towards the 
cost of Autopac, is borne by all policy holders. In effect, the system allows a negligent 
third party to pass the tort liability onto the Autopac system as a whole and to those 
who support it — the general public174. 
In the report's view, negligent « third parties » should not be relieved of 
their liability ; the following is given as a « minimum » listing of such « third 
parties » : 
all levels of government and Crown agencies ; 
automobile repair and service professionals ; 
automobile manufacturers ; 
construction companies ; 
establishments serving alcoholic beverages ; 
owners of farm vehicles operating on highways ; and 
owners of automobiles registered outside Manitoba175. 
These persons are apparently «third parties» because they are not 
policy holders and so are not insured by MPI ; the report reasons that, since 
they have not paid into the plan, the plan should not pay benefits to them. 
However, this misconceives the plan. The plan is not in fact based on 
principles of insurance, as the report supposes. The plan is at its essence one 
of social welfare that seeks to compensate fairly all persons who are injured 
in motor vehicle accidents, irrespective of any moral blameworthiness and 
irrespective of the payment of any premiums. All Manitobans benefit from 
the plan, not merely registered drivers. Thus, the negligent pedestrian who 
darts into traffic and causes injury to himself and to drivers on the road is 
nonetheless compensated. The fact that he has no driver's licence is as 
irrelevant as his negligence. However, by the rationale of the report, that 
negligent pedestrian is a « third party » and should not be able to benefit 
174. USKIW REPORT, p. 47 [bold print in original). 
175. USKIW REPORT, p. 47. 
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from the no-fault plan ; the injured drivers should be able to sue him and, 
presumably, he should have to look to his own resources to cover his own 
losses. By the same logic, not only should establishments serving alcoholic 
beverages be subject to litigation for automobile accidents which they 
cause, so too should individual citizens who overserve a guest at a house 
party. The report makes no mention of the concern of Helper J.A. in the 
McMillan case noted earlier in the paper : the result of the report's recom-
mendation would be « different remedies for victims depending upon the 
proximate cause of an accident. The exact opposite intent is clear from the 
reading of Part 2 and from an examination of the [legislative] debates and 
the [Kopstein] Report176. » 
The failure of a party to pay premiums to MPI is surely not a rationale 
for exposing him or her to liability for negligence. If there is a rationale for 
allowing lawsuits against the parties listed by the report, it must be that 
doing so will act as a deterrent against their negligent conduct and so 
promote public safety. Under the no-fault plan, the automobile manufac-
turer whose negligently manufactured vehicle causes an accident cannot be 
sued for its negligence. The rural municipality which may have negligently 
failed to maintain its roads or to warn of hazards, as was alleged in the 
McMillan case, cannot be sued for those failings. However, before the 
principle of no-fault is compromised to allow lawsuits against such parties, 
one should be confident that liability for negligence does in fact act as a 
deterrent against negligent conduct. If it does, is there a basis for a system 
that allows some to be sued and others not to be, as the report proposes ? 
What would be the rationale for such distinctions ? And if « third parties » 
as the report conceives them (automobile manufacturers, rural municipali-
ties and the like) can be sued, why should the beneficiaries of those lawsuits 
be individuals who have already received the same full compensation as any 
other Manitoban with like injuries would receive ? These are all fair ques-
tions which should be addressed in any consideration of the merits of a 
no-fault compensation plan. Unfortunately the report addresses none of 
them 
176. McMillan v. R.M. of Thompson (Man. C.A.), supra, note 12, 67. 
